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SA (COMOR)/DDS&T

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OXC 4527

Copy 1 of 4

1 MAR 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director, OSA 25X1

SUBJECT: Air Defense Capability of the USSR

REFERENCE: Memorandum to DD/R from AD/OEL;  
dated 14 February 1963; subject:  
Executive Director's Memorandum of  
25 January 1963, Agency Policy on  
Dynamic Intelligence Operations 25X1

1. The attached shows, on careful reading, that the requirement that we levied on OEL and OSI for air-defense appreciation of the SA 2 1/2 or any other air-defense capability of the USSR against the "O" is coming back to us so that we can do our own work. This is understandable inasmuch as it is a bit difficult for those scientists and technicians to figure out the air-defense capabilities unless they have some information. And that is hard to get.

2. In discussing this with Mr. Reber I am advised:

a. That  of OSI, approached COMOR for COMOR's endorsement of a requirement for low-level reconnaissance of the Baltic Island where an SA 2 1/2 is located. This was intended both to provide photography and to activate the signal of the SA 2 1/2, if any. COMOR gave those gentlemen a bit of a bad time and they agreed to go home and do their homework. Meanwhile,  25X1  
I understand, have visited Mr. Reber to get some further help 25X1

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as to how to proceed. During the last week [ ] tried to see Mr. Reber but the latter was too busy in those God-awful COMOR meetings.

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3. In trying to stop this merry-go-round, Mr. Reber has in the most timid fashion called attention to his official role as Special Assistant to the DD/R and, if asked, he would in that capacity call into a locked room the bright guys in OEL, OSI, and OSA and not let them out until they had found a sensible answer to this problem. The truth may really be that at the moment there is no way to identify the capability of the SA 2 1/2 and that as a matter of fact, at least initially, when "O" is operational, the only way to protect it is to stay away from an SA 2 1/2, these having been identified

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4. RECOMMENDATION:

I recommend that you request SA/DDR to provide the assistance outlined in paragraph 3. above, and that this assignment be simply accomplished by signing your name on the space allotted below and then delivering the paper to Mr. Reber.

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[ ]  
Chief, Operations Division, OSA

APPROVED: [ ]

JACK C. LEDFORD  
COLONEL USAF  
Assistant Director  
(Special Activities)

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25 January 1963

**AGENCY POLICY ON DYNAMIC INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS**

The Director has indicated that he wants the Agency to be very aggressive in taking the initiative to obtain permission for any and all types of intelligence operations to obtain required information for national security. This means that the Agency should always be requesting additional overflights for key or suspect areas, seeking permission for covert or clandestine operations against key targets, and generally taking the lead in imaginative and dynamic oper